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PUBLIC LAW
CRIMINAL LAW
John S. Baker, Jr. *
CRIMINAL CONDUCT-THE MENTAL ELEMENT
To what extent can the definition of particular crimes de-
part from the requirement of culpability? In State v. Terrell'
the supreme court had before it, but passed over, the opportun-
ity to clarify this most fundamental issue concerning criminal
conduct. The trial court had quashed an indictment that
charged a failure to file state income taxes, finding the statute2
'contrary to fairness,' lacking a required criminal intent and
therefore unconstitutional."3 Unpersuaded, the supreme court
reversed without a dissenting vote.
The supreme court rejected the "claim that criminal con-
duct requires intent to do or fail to do something,"' or, in other
words, that a crime requires a mental element. The court found
the argument "specifically answered" by section 2 of Criminal
Code article 8, which defines criminal conduct as "[a] mere
act or failure to act that produces criminal consequences, when
there is no requirement of criminal intent."' Rather summa-
rily, the court concluded: "A crime may therefore be enacted
where there is no requirement of criminal intent when there is
a failure to act which produces criminal consequences. Thus
not filing timely in this case, a failure to act, resulted in no
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 352 So. 2d 220 (La. 1977).
2. LA. R.S. 47:107 (Supp. 1970) (as it appeared prior to 1977 La. Acts, No. 527,
§ 1) provided in pertinent part:
[F]ailure to file a return ... in accordance with the requirements of this Sub-
part and within the time periods specified in R.S. 47:103 shall be punished by
a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more
than six months, unless approval for a delay in filing is authorized by the
collector of revenue in writing and in addition, the penalties set forth in R.S.
47:1602 shall be invoked.
3. 352 So. 2d at 221.
4. Id.
5. LA. R.S. 14:8(2) (1950).
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timely tax return by the defendant, a criminal consequence.",
What the writer finds objectional about the decision is the
absence of a reasoned justification for the upholding of this
particular statute and, moreover, the use of open-ended lan-
guage in reaching a conclusion concerning so fundamental an
issue. To simply say, as the court did, that Criminal Code
article 8(2) "specifically answered" the issue is inadequate.
First, the power of a legislature to declare acts criminal ir-
respective of intent is not constitutionally without limit.7 Sec-
ond, courts traditionally have limited the class of statutes
which have been construed to impose strict liability.' All of
which is to say that the significance of the issue merits more
thoughtful consideration than the court appears to have given
the matter.
Intent-The Constitutional Constraints
The defendant raised a due process claim, asserting that
constitutionally a criminal statute must include an intent, a
mens rea.9 The court never actually addressed the constitu-
tional claim, although, as the opinion noted, it was the "sole
contention on . . . appeal."'" Instead, the court relied solely on
its construction of section 2 of article 8. That reliance, however,
on one statutory provision to uphold another was hardly re-
sponsive to the constitutional challenge.
The argument that, as a constitutional matter, no crime
can exist without a mental element or mens rea finds support
from commentators," but not from the cases. The United
6. 352 So. 2d at 221.
7. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
8. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). "In problems relevant
to criminal law, strict liability means liability to punitive sanctions despite the lack
of mens rea." J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 325 (2d ed. 1960).
9. Presumably, the defendant did not imply any challenge to the legislative
authority to define crime in terms of criminal negligence. LA. R.S. 14:8(3) (1950). But
see Professor Jerome Hall's discussion of the relation of criminal negligence to mens
rea. J. HALL, supra note 8, at 133-41.
10. 352 So. 2d at 221.
11. "The time has come to recognize that there has been a violation of due
process whenever there has been any deprivation of liberty or property resulting from
a conviction based upon liability without fault." R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 811 (2d ed.
1969). "In view of the nature of criminal conduct, there is no avoiding the conclusion
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States Supreme Court has generally upheld the constitution-
ality of strict liability statutes. 2 Nevertheless, as one commen-
tator has stated, "it is apparent that serious questioning of the
constitutionality of statutes imposing strict liability is far from
being precluded."' 3 The present situation is probably best
characterized by Justice Brennan in Smith v. California:"
[I]t is doubtless competent for the states to create strict
criminal liabilities by defining criminal offenses without
any element of scienter-though even where no freedom-
of-expression question is involved, there is precedent in
this Court that this power is not without limitations. See
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225. 5
The Lambert case,"6 relied on in Smith, could have pro-
vided the Louisiana Supreme Court with a rationale for accept-
ing the defendant's claim or, at least, placing a particular con-
struction on the statute. Lambert held unconstitutional a mu-
nicipal ordinance requiring all convicted felons to register with
police within five days after arriving in the city. The Court
distinguished this case from others, noting that "we deal here
with conduct that is wholly passive-mere failure to register.
It is unlike the commission of acts, or the failure to act under
circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences
of his deed."' 7
Federal appellate courts have differed in their application
of Lambert.'8 In United States v. Mancuso, "a concerning a fed-
eral statute which required narcotics violators to register upon
that strict liability cannot be brought within the scope of the penal law." J. HALL,
supra note 8, at 336. See also H. HART, The Aims of the Criminal Law, in 23 LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 401 (1958).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Shevlin-Carpenter v.
Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
13. J. HALL, supra note 8, at 355.
14. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
15. Id. at 150.
16. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
17. Id. at 228 (emphasis added).
18. Compare United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970), with Reyes
v. United States, 258 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1958), and United States v. Logan, 434 F.2d
131 (9th Cir. 1970).
19. 420 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970).
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entering or exiting the country, the Second Circuit has inter-
preted Lambert to require proof of knowledge of the statute or
reasonable probability of such knowledge before punishing
such a failure or omission. This interpretation supports the
argument that Louisiana's failure-to-file-taxes statute, like-
wise punishing "conduct that is wholly passive," should have
been construed to require at least reasonable probability of
such knowledge in order to meet the constitutional standard. 0
Presumably, probable knowledge about the duty to file state
income taxes could easily be demonstrated. Indeed, the court's
failure to take the defendant's claim more seriously may have
been due to an unarticulated presumption that reasonable
probability of such knowledge existed.
The significant constitutional issue suggested by Terrell,
however, relates not so much to the particular tax statute as
to section 2 of article 8. The holding of Terrell, in the narrowest
sense, namely that the misdemeanor statute punishing the fail-
ure to file a tax return requires no intent, has little significance
beyond this case because the statute has been amended to
require that the failure to file be "intentional."'" In the broader
sense, Terrell implies that objections to defining a crime with-
20. In United States v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit held
that a federal misdemeanor statute punishing failure to comply with certain internal
revenue provisions does not require proof of intent. Having considered Lambert and
other cases, the court noted:
We are not unconcerned with the important policy and jurisprudential
principles associated with the traditional rule that criminal liability requires
some showing of criminal intent. But our concern is ameliorated in this case by
the fact that this crime cannot be committed unknowingly .... [T]he statu-
tory scheme makes it clear that one cannot be criminally liable unless he has
first been personally advised that he is in violation of the tax code, and there-
after continues to fail to handle the funds as required by law. Of course, one's
failure to comply with section 7512(b)'s provisions may be due to circumstances
beyond his control, such as theft or destruction, or he may have a reasonable
doubt as to whether he is responsible for the collection of a particular tax. The
exceptions to section 7215 expressly provide, however, that the statute is not
violated when either of these circumstances exists. . . .Thus, while intent need
not be proven as an element of the offense, the individual is adequately pro-
tected by the guarantee of notice and opportunity to correct nonconforming
conduct.
Id. at 215-16 (citations omitted).
21. 1977 La. Acts, No. 527, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 47:107 (Supp. 1970).
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out a criminal intent or mens rea are "specifically answered"
by section 2 of article 8. The opinion leaves that impression
because it does not hedge with qualification nor offer even the
slightest constitutional justification for its result, as if to sug-
gest that whether a crime includes a mens rea is a matter of
indifference to the judiciary.
If the court had considered the question of constitution-
ality thoroughly, it might have sustained the statute for good
cause despite the previously discussed rationale for its uncon-
stitutionality. The matter is not free from doubt. Certain types
of offenses, usually referred to as "public welfare offenses" 2  or
"civil offenses," 23 often impose "strict liability" or liability
without a mens rea. While no clearly defined category has been
judicially promulgated,2 certain types of offenses are generally
so classified.2 5 Contrariwise, common law crimes or crimes
carrying a serious penalty are not likely to meet constitutional
standards of due process if they require no mental element.'
Beyond that, "[w]hen confronted with a challenge to a statute
. . .which on its face appears to impose strict or absolute
liability, the courts can turn to no precise and easily applied
formula for a solution; many factors must go into the cruci-
ble." In considering "many factors"-something the Terrell
opinion did not do-the court ultimately is called on to "relate
abandonment of the ingredient of intent, not merely with con-
siderations of expediency in obtaining convictions, nor with the
malum prohibitum classification of the crime, but with the
22. See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. Rv. 55 (1933).
23. See Perkins, The Civil Offense, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 832 (1952).
24. "Neither this Court nor, so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken to
delineate a precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between
crimes that require a mental element and crimes that do not. We attempt no closed
definition, for the law on the subject is neither settled nor static." Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952).
25. Sayre, supra note 22, at 73, lists eight general categories, summarized as
follows: (1) illegal sales of intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of impure or adulterated food
or drugs, (3) sales of misbranded articles, (4) violations of narcotic statutes, (5) crimi-
nal nuisances, (6) violations of traffic regulations, (7) violations of motor-vehicle laws,
and (8) violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety, health or well-
being of the community.
26. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
27. United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 1976).
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peculiar nature and quality of the offense."28
The Louisiana Supreme Court had followed such an ap-
proach in State v. Birdsell.2' The case involved a narcotics
statute which punished the possession of a hypodermic syringe
and needle without any mention in the statute of a knowledge
or intent requirement. In an earlier decision involving the same
defendant, the court had reversed the defendant's conviction
because he had been denied "his right to introduce evidence for
the purpose of explaining his possession of these prohibited
articles to an end to negate and repel the charge of guilty
knowledge and illegal intent or motive."30 When finally faced
with the question of the statute's constitutionality, the court
ruled that it violated due process:
Inasmuch as an accused charged under LRS 40:962 (B)
cannot show (as a defense) that his possession of a hypod-
ermic syringe or needle (without a Louisiana physician's
prescription) is for harmless use such statutory provision,
in our opinion, is unreasonable and hence unconstitu-
tional. Created thereby is a conclusive presumption that
the possession is for an illegal purpose-an unrebuttable
presumption which factually runs counter to human expe-
rience.'
Given the decision in BirdseUl, decided on due process
grounds, the court in Terrell should not have dismissed so
quickly the defendant's contention that constitutionally a
crime must include a mental element.
Intent-The Problem of Statutory Construction
The constitutional issue presented in Terrell might arise
more frequently if strict liability were not very much an excep-
tion to the rule. Article 8 of the Criminal Code does not specifi-
cally state that the nature and quality of certain offenses re-
28. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 259 (1952) (emphasis added).
29. 235 La. 396, 104 So. 2d 148 (1958), noted in 19 LA. L. Rav. 519 (1959).
30. State v. Birdsell, 232 La. 725, 730, 95 So. 2d 290, 292 (1957), noted in 18 LA.
L. REv. 340 (1958).
31. 235 La. at 412, 104 So. 2d at 153.
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quire a mental element.2 Rther, the article seems to leave the
determination of whether or not a crime includes a mental
element to the legislature. Nevertheless, with relatively few
exceptions, the crimes defined in the Criminal Code do include
a mental element, either an intent or criminal negligence. This
is not surprising because the Criminal Code consists of the
traditional common law crimes and most other significant
crimes." The well-understood meanings of most of these crimes
include a mental element. Any attempt to eliminate the men-
tal element from such crimes would likely meet serious chal-
lenge, legislatively as well as constitutionally.
Article 8's definition of criminal conduct also applies to
offenses defined outside the Code. As stated in article 7, "[a]
crime is that conduct which is defined as criminal in this Code,
or in other Acts of the legislature, or in the constitution of the
state."34 These "other acts of the legislature" include, among
others, the instant tax statute, the narcotics offenses of title 40,
and the miscellaneous crimes and offenses of title 14.15 The
legislature has often explicitly required a mental element for
these non-common law offenses.36 Moreover, the fact that the
legislature amended the instant tax statute by adding the word
"intentional" should negate the easy assumption that the ab-
sence of an explicitly stated mental element necessarily indi-
cates the legislature's desire to eliminate intent as a require-
ment.37
32. The comment to article 8 merely states that "some crimes do not require
criminal intent." Neither the article nor the comment indicates any criteria for deter-
mining which crimes do, and which do not, require an intent.
33. Probably the most significant crimes in terms of frequency and severity not
found in the Criminal Code are the narcotics offenses of title 40 of the Revised Statutes.
34. LA. R.S. 14:7 (1950) (emphasis added).
35. LA. R.S. 14:201-501 (1950).
36. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 14:211 (1950), 14:219 (Supp. 1964), 14:220 (Supp. 1964 &
1975), 14:222 (Supp. 1966).
37. Perusing the "Miscellaneous Crime and Offenses" of the Criminal Code pro-
vides further proof that the legislature often omits saying what it intends to communi-
cate. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 14:201 (1950) (collateral securities, unauthorized use or with-
drawal prohibited). The inartful drafting of this statute is characteristic of the chapter.
After defining the offense at length without mention of a mental element and providing
a serious penalty of up to ten years with or without hard labor, the statute states as
follows: "Proof of any of the acts set forth in this Section shall be considered prima
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When faced with a statute lacking an explicit intent re-
quirement, the court must construe the statute. The matter
may not always be resolvable simply by reference to the legisla-
ture's intent. In such situations, the court's construction, either
in favor of or against strict liability, proceeds from fundamen-
tal notions about criminal conduct. Formerly, as State v.
Johnson8 demonstrates in construing a narcotics offense, the
court has disfavored strict liability: "[G]uilty knowledge is an
essential ingredient of the crime of possession of narcotic drugs.
The crime of unlawful possession of narcotic drugs as de-
nounced by law cannot exist without proof of guilty knowledge;
for, such possession would not be a possession contemplated by
the statutes. ' 39 This insistence on a mental element for narcot-
ics possession derives not from constitutional principles, hardly
at all from legislative intent, but rather from the nature of the
offense.
Johnson assumes a different attitude toward strict liability
than does Terrell. This difference in attitude may partially, but
not completely, be attributable to the penalties involved. One
writer has said that the court's* willingness to construe Louis-
iana's narcotics statutes to require "knowledge" was due to the
substantial punishment attached. 0 An argument based on the
converse proposition, namely that a relatively light penalty for
the failure to file a tax return justifies a strict liability construc-
tion, does not follow. The severity of the penalty is often ranked
as only one among several relevant considerations and not nec-
essarily the controlling one in construing a statute." While a
facie evidence of criminal intent. The State may proceed further and prove criminal
intent by any competent evidence in its possession." LA. R.S. 14:201 (1950). The
draftsman has provided for the method of proving criminal intent, without stating that
intent is an element of the crime. It seems that he and the legislature presumed that
the prohibited acts inherently involve criminal intent. But for the addendum state-
ment regarding proof, no one would have known. The supreme court has correctly
assumed that "[i]ntent is an essential ingredient of [this] crime." State v. Ackal,
290 So. 2d 882, 885 (La. 1974).
38. 228 La. 317, 82 So. 2d 24 (1955).
39. Id. at 334, 82 So. 2d at 30 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
40. See Note, Criminal Intent or Knowledge as an Element of Unlawful Posses-
sion Under the Narcotics Law, 18 LA. L. REv. 340, 344 (1958).
41. The factors to be considered when construing a statute are enumerated by
LaFave and Scott as follows:
A number of factors may be considered of importance in deciding whether
the legislature meant to impose liability without fault or, on the other hand,
[Vol. 39
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stiff penalty should preclude strict liability, a relatively minor
penalty should not justify a construction of strict liability.
Other considerations emphasize the contrast between
Johnson's approach and Terrell's unstudied construction. First
of all, the legislature's amendment, while Terrell was pending,
to provide that the failure-to-file must be "intentional" ought
to have been persuasive regarding the legislature's intent in
enacting the statute at issue. Although the opinion correctly
rejects the claim that this amendment required a quashing of
the indictment,42 the court would have been justified in con-
cluding that the amendment merely clarified the legislature's
original intent that the statute require proof of an
"intentional" failure to file. More importantly, however, the
court's unnecessary favoring of a strict liability construction
directly contradicts the primary principle relied on in Johnson,
to wit: "[N]o crime can exist without the combination of a
criminal act and a criminal intent, or an evil motive, or with a
really meant to require fault though it failed to spell it out clearly. (1) The
legislative history of the statute or its title may throw some light on the
matter. (2) The severity of the punishment provided for the crime is of import-
ance. Other things being equal, the greater the possible punishment, the more
likely some fault is required; and, conversely, the lighter the possible punish-
ment, the more likely the legislature meant to impose liability without fault. (3)
The seriousness of harm to the public which may be expected to follow from the
forbidden conduct is another factor. Other things being equal, the more serious
the consequences to the public, the more likely the legislature meant to impose
liability without regard to fault, and vice versa. (4) The defendant's opportunity
to ascertain the true facts, is yet another factor which may be important in
determining whether the legislature really meant to impose liability on one who
was without fault because he lacked knowledge of these facts. The harder to find
out the truth, the more likely the legislature meant to require fault in not
knowing; the easier to ascertain the truth, the more likely failure to know is no
excuse. (5) The number of prosecutions to be expected is another factor of some
importance. The fewer the expected prosecutions, the more likely the legislature
meant to require the prosecuting officials to go into the issue of fault; the greater
the number of prosecutions, the more likely the legislature meant to impose
liability without regard to fault. All the above factors thus have a bearing on
the question of the interpretation of the empty statute, but no single factor can
be said to be controlling. Thus some statutes have been held to impose liability
without fault although the possible punishment was quite severe, generally
because one or more of the other factors pointed toward strict liability.
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAw 219 (1972) (emphasis added).
42. 352 So. 2d at 221.
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guilty knowledge of its consequences."4
This principle, if literally observed, would eliminate strict
liability, at least to the extent of removing such offenses from
the definition of criminal conduct in Louisiana's Criminal
Code. Consequently, acceptance of the principle raises certain
objections. First of all, one writer has objected that the exist-
ence of a class of criminal acts termed "civil offenses" gives
reason to question the accuracy of Johnson's broad statement."
The criticism, however, overlooks the significance of the terms
"civil offense" and "public welfare offense." These terms have
resulted from the judgment that such offenses are not truly
"criminal." 4 The terminological distinction reflects the gen-
eral agreement that strict liability offenses should be removed
"from the type of moral condemnation that is and ought to be
implicit when a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed.""
More to the point, article 8 seems to conflict with the
principle enunciated in Johnson in that it designates offenses
which have no requirement of criminal intent as falling within
the definition of criminal conduct. Again, however, article 8
offers no particular guidance on the matter of statutory con-
struction. Moreover, article 8 itself is subject to construction.
Although all crimes in Louisiana are statutory, that does not
eliminate the need for statutory construction. This in turn
sometimes requires reference to other sources, including the
common law and general jurisprudence, in order to determine
the meaning of particular statutes. 7 If, as this writer does, one
construes article 8 within the context of general Anglo-
American notions of criminal conduct, then sections 1 (requir-
ing intent) and 2 (dispensing with intent) of that article cease
to stand on equal footing. Section 2 appears as exceptional
because "[tihe existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather
43. 228 La. at 334, 82 So. 2d at 30. Accord, State v. Birdsell, 232 La. 725, 730,
95 So. 2d 290, 291 (1957).
44. Note, supra note 40, at 343.
45. See J. HALL, supra note 8, at 336; R. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 784.
46. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) as quoted
in W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 41, at 223.
47. See, e.g., State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799 (La. 1975).
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than the exception to the principles of Anglo-American crimi-
nal jurisprudence."48
A Proposed Construction of Article 8
Our understanding of article 8 must recognize, at the very
least, that mens rea is the rule, rather than the exception, in
defining criminal conduct. In fact, the content of the Criminal
Code currently conforms to this principle. Terrell, however,
implies that the Code need not do so. If accepted, this notion
allows for a gradual and ill-considered departure from the well-
settled understanding of the definitions of criminal conduct. In
order to avoid such a development, the de facto application of
article 8 needs to be made explicit.
The writer would prefer to exclude offenses lacking a men-
tal element from the definition of "crime" and to substitute
some other method for dealing with the so-called "civil offen-
ses."'" That, however, would require a legislative amendment
to article 8's definition of criminal conduct. Nevertheless,
within its constitutional authority and consistently with the
current content of the Criminal Code, the supreme court could
implement the principle that no crime shall be punished by
imprisonment unless a mental element has been proven.
The supreme court should read article 8 in conjunction
with the state constitutional provision against "excessive"
sentencesw Article 8 permits the definition of "crime" to ex-
clude a mental element, but makes no reference to the permis-
sible punishment. The legislature has in fact acted consistently
with general Anglo-American principles of criminal justice by
avoiding lengthy prison terms for strict liability, although
nothing in the Criminal Code explicitly so requires. Neverthe-
less, if the legislature should choose to abandon such self-
imposed restraint, the state constitutional provision against
excessive sentences provides a newly-created constraint. The
supreme court has recently recognized its constitutional au-
48. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951).
49. See text at notes 44-46, supra. See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 8, at 351-59.
50. LA. CONST. art. I, § 20 provides: "No law shall subject any person ...to
cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment." (Emphasis added.)
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thority to declare sentences "excessive."' This authority ena-
bles the court to declare both that the legislated penalty for a
particular crime is per se excessive and also that, despite a
generally permissible penalty, the imposition of such a sent-
ence in a particular case is excessive.52
The writer suggests that article 8 be read in light of the
following proposed constitutional limitations on sentence.
First, any statute punishable by more than six months impris-
onment imposes an excessive punishment unless it requires, or
is construed to require, a mental element.A Second, as for those
statutes not requiring a mental element and having a possible
punishment of six months or less, the supreme court should
require, pursuant to the sentence guidelines of Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure article 894.1, that the trial court find that the
particular defendant actually had a culpable state of mind
before the court can impose a jail sentence .5 This latter sugges-
tion recognizes that often a statute without an intent require-
ment regulates both conduct with and conduct without in-
tent.0 Under such circumstances, it is appropriate to reserve
imprisonment for those defendants who -actually evidenced
fault. By adopting these suggestions regarding article 8 and
utilizing its sentencing review authority, the court would pro-
51. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979).
52. Id. at 766-67.
53. See the United States Supreme Court's construction of the sixth amendment
right to jury trial. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968). The court distinguished between "crimes" and "petty offenses" by
drawing the line at six months possible imprisonment.
54. LA. CODE CrIM. P. art. 894.1(B)(4) provides: "B. The following grounds, while
not controlling the discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in its determination
of suspension of sentence or probation:. . .(4) There was substantial grounds tending
to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a
defense ... .
55. There seems to have been a tacit assumption that the areas occupied
by crime and by civil offense must be mutually exclusive. This is not necessarily
so and a permitted overlapping would provide a much better basis for enforce-
ment. . . .If it is a civil offense the penalty should not exceed a moderate fine,
but there is no such limitation if it is a crime. And if, as is true in many of these
laws, the penalty may be either, this should be understood to be an overlapping
provision with imprisonment authorized only for such violations as fall within
the category of crime.
R. P KINs, supra note 11, at 796.
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hibit imprisonment unless the, defendant's offense involved
actual fault as evidenced by some mental element.
The writer submits that the proposed construction of arti-
cle 8 conforms well with the current content of the Criminal
Code."6 Only a few statues carrying a penalty over six months
even arguably eliminate the mental element. The writer con-
tends that almost all of these few exceptions can be shown not
to eliminate the mental element. This assertion allows for the
fact that most of these few constitute a group of statutes de-
signed to protect juveniles and often specifically state that lack
of knowledge of the juvenile's age is no defense. It is commonly
and, the writer submits, incorrectly assumed that such statutes
necessarily eliminate the mental element. 7 A showing that the
crimes protecting juveniles fit within the proposed construction
of article 8 should remove a major objection to accepting the
proposed construction.
First of all, the non-sex offenses involving juveniles in-
cluded among articles 91-9318 and their subsections contain
only one offense, itself peculiar, which does not conform to the
suggested reading of article 8. The alcohol-related offenses con-
tained therein rank among those most commonly recognized as
"public welfare offenses."" If strict liability offenses are con-
sidered appropriate at all, then these offenses"0 qualify because
56. The proposed construction would apply as well to offenses defined outside
the Criminal C ode because, by its terms, article 8 extends to such offenses. The writer
nevertheless is concerned only with reconciling the theory with the Criminal Code, the
primary compilation of criminal law and, ideally, an integrated body of statutes. The
offenses outside the Criminal Code represent miscellany. See LA. R.S. 14:201-501
(1950). Not only do these statutes lack the coherence of a code, but, individually, they
often lack even internal coherence. See note 37, supra.
57. See, e.g., Note, Criminal Law-Constitutionality of Statute Prohibiting Pos-
session of Hypodermic Needle Without Criminal Intent, 19 LA. L. REv. 519, 520 n.10
(1959).
58. LA. R.S. 14:91-93.2 (1950 & Supp. 1968).
59. Sayre, supra note 22, at 73.
60. LA. R.S. 14:91 (1950) (unlawful sales to minors), 14:91.1 (Supp. 1958) (unlaw-
ful purchase of alcoholic beverages by persons over seventeen and under eighteen years
of age), 14:91.2 (Supp. 1958) (unlawful purchase of alcoholic beverages by persons
under age seventeen-provides remand to juvenile court), 14:91.3 (Supp. 1958) (unlaw-
ful purchase of alcoholic beverages by adults on behalf of minors), 14:92(3) (1950 &
Supp. 1968) (contributing to the delinquency of juveniles-involving visits to places
selling alcohol).
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they lack the stigma of crime; they also carry maximum penal-
ties of six months or less. The "cruelty to juveniles" statute
presents a somewhat different matter because cruelty connotes
a mental state and the statute provides a serious penalty of up
to ten years with or without hard labor." The fact that lack-
of-knowledge-of-age is not a defense to this offense, however,
does not mean that the statute imposes strict liability. 2 In
order to constitute strict liability, the lack of knowledge, not
recognized as a defense, must negate the mental element. This
statute's mental element, i.e., "an intentional or criminally
negligent mistreatment," does not depend on knowledge of the
victim's age. The mental element may exist regardless of the
victim's age, although no criminal liability results unless the
victim is a juvenile. As for the remaining non-sex offenses, only
a supplemental "contributing to child delinquency" statute 3
fails to conform to the theory; the few others which carry a
punishment exceeding six months do not impose strict liabil-
ity.6'
Under some circumstances, the two statutes pertaining to
"contributing to juvenile delinquency" 5 impose strict liability.
61. LA. R.S. 14:93 (1950), as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 55, § 1. See State
v. Barr, 354 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1978).
62. See R. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 789.
63. LA. R.S. 14:92.1 (Supp. 1954).
64. The following statutes carry possible penalties of six months or less: LA. R.S.
14:91.12 (Supp. 1977) (sale .. .to minors [of] publications encouraging . . . illegal
use of controlled dangerous substances), 14:91.21 (Supp. 1970) (sale of poisonous rep-
tiles to minors), 14:92 (1950) (except subsection 7) (contributing to the delinquency of
juveniles), and 14:93.1 (Supp. 1966) (use or unlawful sale to minors of model glue).
Moreover, only Revised Statutes 14:92 specifies that lack of knowledge of the juvenile's
age provides no defense.
Revised Statutes 14:91.11, 14:92(7) and 14:93.2 carry possible penalties exceeding
six months, but nevertheless should not be considered to impose strict liability. Re-
vised Statutes 91.11 (sale .. .of material harmful to minors) provides that lack of
knowledge is no defense but further states: "unless the defendant shows that he had
reasonable cause to believe .... ," thus permitting the defense of reasonable mistake
of fact. Revised Statutes 14:92(7) (contributing to the delinquency of juveniles by
causing the juvenile to "perform any sexually immoral act") does not impose strict
liability. See notes 66 and 85, infra. Revised Statutes 14:93.2 specifies no intent and
carries a maximum penalty of one year. Because the statute does not preclude lack of
knowledge as a defense, the statute can easily be construed to require a mental ele-
ment. See text at notes 37-39, supra.
65. LA. R.S. 14:92 (1950), 14:92.1 (Supp. 1954).
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As discussed below, both statutes do so when they punish a
defendant for encouraging a juvenile in "drinking beverages of
. ..alcoholic content" even when the adult lacks knowledge
of the juvenile's age. Nevertheless, the original statute, Revised
Statutes 14:92, presents no problem for the theory because it
imposes a maximum penalty of six months." The supplemen-
tal statute, Revised Statutes 14:92.1, however, carries a greater
possible punishment and therefore conflicts with the theory.
The fact that the supplemental statute falls within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the juvenile court, unlike the principal stat-
ute, tends to limit its significance for the Code.
State v. Elias7 points up the problem that the inability to
deal with strict liability issues flows from confusion concerning
the concept of mens rea. The opinion deals with the same
"contributing to juvenile delinquency" statute, in its particu-
lar application to alcoholic beverages, which has been dis-
cussed. Initially, the opinion notes that many exceptions to the
mens rea requirement have been recognized, citing Morrissette
v. United States" and examples mentioned therein." In the
same paragraph, the court states that "[cirimes involving ju-
veniles .. .often do not require knowledge of the child's age
as an essential element."70 The opinion does not conclude, how-
ever, that this or similar statutes lack a mens rea. Rather, it
asserts both that "the mens rea required [by Revised Statutes
14:92] is general criminal intent, not specific criminal intent"
and also that "the age of the juvenile, only one of the several
elements of the offense, is not subject to the mens rea require-
ment."'7 In other words, the court concludes that only certain
66. LA. R.S. 14:92 A(7) (1950), as amended by 1976 La. Acts No. 121, § 2 (per-
form any sexually immoral act), carries a maximum possible punishment of two years.
The writer submits that this section does not impose strict liability for the same
reasons discussed in connection with Revised Statutes 14:80. See text at notes 84-87,
infra, and note 85, infra. Whether Revised Statutes 14:92(7) is unconstitutional as
being void for vagueness presents a related but distinct issue. See State v. Defrances,
351 So. 2d 133 (La. 1977).
67. 357 So. 2d 275 (La. 1978).
68. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
69. 357 So. 2d at 278.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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elements of the crime require a mens rea,72 but it does not
commit itself as to whether, when all elements are considered,
the crime requires that the defendant be at fault.
The court's discussion of mens rea confuses, rather than
clarifies, one's understanding of the concept because it fails to
regard mens rea as the ultimate evaluation of criminal con-
duct."3 Mens rea, or guilty mind, indicates blameworthiness."
It exists when there is a concurrence of the mental and voli-
tional elements; 3 it consists of "an actual harm and the mental
state of the actor who voluntarily commits it.""7 The offense of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, with respect to the
particular subsection, i.e., "intentional enticing . . . to visit
any place where [alcoholic] beverages . . . are the principal
commodity sold or given away,"77 does not require a mens rea
or guilty mind because the harm involved exists only when the
person enticed is under a certain age. Blameworthiness is ab-
sent when the defendant is unaware of the juvenile's age be-
cause he is unaware that he has caused a harm. The fact that
the statute requires some intentional act only means that it
does not impose absolute liability, as distinct from strict liabil-
ity."8 The intentional enticing of someone other than a juvenile
to a place where alcoholic beverages are sold involves inten-
tional conduct, but it lacks blameworthiness because the act
does not cause an actual or a prescribed harm.7" Thus, as re-
gards this offense, an honest mistake as to a juvenile's age does
negate blameworthiness or culpability.
This analysis does not mean that an honest mistake re-
garding a juvenile's age negates blameworthiness in offenses
72. Such a conclusion finds support in the discussion of mens rea in W. LA FAVE
& A. Scorr, supra note 41, at 194-95. The inadequacy of this view, however, appears
evident to the writer when compared to the more thorough consideration of mens rea
offered by Professor Hall. See J. HALL, supra note 8, at 70-104.
73. See, J. HALL, supra note 8, at 70.
74. Id. at 71.
75. Id. at 70.
76. Id. at 72.
77. LA. R.S. 14:92(3) (1950 & Supp. 1968).
78. R. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 801. See also H. GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 343 (1979).
79. See J. HALL, supra note 8, at 72-73.
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which involve different harms. Similarity of wording does not
necessarily indicate an identical mental element. 0 It seems,
however, that the Elias opinion assumes that all crimes involv-
ing juveniles which do not require knowledge of the child's age
involve the same mens rea or lack of one.8' Rather than focusing
only on statutory language, one must consider the nature of the
harm as well as the requirement of a mental state in order to
determine whether the offense requires a mens rea. 2 In other
words, characterization of the defendant's state of mind de-
pends largely on the nature of the particular harm, as defined
by the particular offense, because his mind must advert to the
proscribed criminal consequences."
Confusion concerning the concept of mens rea has caused
a common mistake of interpreting certain serious offenses as
imposing strict liability because lack of knowledge of some fact
is no defense to the crime.8 These more serious crimes actually
do not impose strict liability as can be seen by reference to the
sex crimes involving juveniles, particularly carnal knowledge of
a juvenile8 (statutory rape as it is known in many jurisdic-
tions). Some conclude that, because a mistake of fact regarding
the age of a consenting female provides no defense, the crime
imposes strict liability.8 As Perkins explains, however, this is
80. See text at notes 61-65, supra.
81. See 357 So. 2d at 278 n.4.
82. See J. HALL, supra note 8, at 70-77.
83. See LA. R.S. 14:8-11 (1950). But see Professor Hall's discussion of intention,
recklessness and negligence. J. HALL, supra note 8, at 105-45.
84. H. GRoss, supra note 78, at 373; R. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 789.
85. LA. R.S. 14:80 (1950 & Supp. 1978). The analysis of Revised Statutes 14:80
applies also to LA. R.S. 14:42(3) (1950 & Supp. 1978) (aggravated rape of a female
under twelve); LA. R.S. 14:81 (1950) (indecent behavior with juveniles); LA. R.S.
14:81.1 (Supp. 1977) (pornography involving juveniles); LA. R.S. 14:86 (1950 & Supp.
1978) (enticing persons into prostitution); and LA. R.S. 14:92(7) (1950) (contributing
to the delinquency of juveniles through performing any sexual, immoral act).
86. See H. GROSS, supra note 78, at 373; R. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 789. State
v. Dierlamm, 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938), noted in the comments to LA. R.S. 14:80
(1950 & Supp. 1978), discusses the carnal knowledge of a juvenile as follows:
The offense defined in this statute is purely a statutory crime, and makes
no mention of felonious intent or guilty knowledge.
As Act. No. 192 of 1912 denounces a statutory crime and makes the act of
carnal knowledge defined therein indictable, without regard to felonious intent,
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not so because "[c]onduct may be sufficiently wrongful to
supply the general mens rea even if no punishment has been
provided therefore, and a mistake which would merely leave
the supposed deed in such a category is not exculpating.""T
Current mores may create a certain resistance to applying
such a view to the crime of carnal knowledge of a juvenile 88
because the view depends on the notion held by "the courts,
down through the ages . . . that one intending to have illicit
sexual intercourse has mens rea because he is purposely engag-
ing in a wrongful act."81 Rather than agree with this statement,
some might prefer to call the offense a strict liability crime.
Further analysis of the Criminal Code, however, indicates that
Louisiana's carnal knowledge statute should not be considered
as imposing strict liability.
If one views carnal knowledge 0 as requiring no mens rea,
then one must also conclude that the statute defining aggra-
or guilty knowledge, the refusal of the trial judge to charge the jury that the state
must prove, in order to convict, that "the accused party knew that the prosecu-
trix was unmarried and was under the age of 18 years" was correct, and is
approved.
189 La. at 558; 180 So. at 139. This language is the type which has prompted the
conclusion that such statutes impose strict liability. The court's statement, like the
wording of Revised Statutes 14:80, may suggest, but does not compel, that conclusion.
87. R. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 818 (footnotes omitted). Perkins continues:
The more familiar applications of the rule are found in prosecutions for statutory
rape (carnal knowledge of a child), abduction, and adultery. A man who has
illicit sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of consent is guilty of statutory
rape although she consented and he mistakenly believed she was older than the
limit thus established. This is true no matter how reasonable his mistaken belief
may have been, as in cases in which both her appearance and her positive
statement indicated she was older than the statutory age or in which he had
exercised considerable pains in the effort to ascertain her age.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also H. GRoss, supra note 78, at 364-66. But see W. LAFAv E
& A. Scorr, supra note 41, at 369-74.
88. See People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673
(1964).
89. R. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 819.
90. LA. R.S. 14:80 (1950 & Supp. 1977) (as it appeared prior to 1978 La. Acts,
No. 757, § 1) provided in part:
Carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed when anyone over the age of seven-
teen has sexual intercourse, with her consent, with any unmarried female person
of the age of twelve years or over, but under the age of seventeen years, where
there is an age difference of greater than two years between the two persons.
Lack of knowledge of the female's age shall not be a defense.
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vated rape of a female under twelve"' likewise lacks a mens rea
requirement'-an unacceptable conclusion given its penalty.
Examining the elements of criminal conduct, one understands
that the two crimes do not differ as regards the act or mens rea,
but only as to the criminal consequences. Both statutes punish
the same act, illicit intercourse. Neither the female's age nor
her consent or lack thereof affect the defendant's act. Rather,
they define the harm or criminal consequence of that act, as
distinct from the act.'3 The relevant ages merely mark the
points at which the legislature has determined that the defen-
dant's act creates such harm as to merit criminalization, and
they mark the degree of that harm." Illicit intercourse becomes
criminal if the unmarried female is younger than seventeen.' 5
The degree of the male's criminal liability (carnal knowledge
or rape) when the female is between twelve and seventeen de-
pends on whether she in fact consented. If the female is under
twelve, the male has committed a rape regardless of whether
the female in fact consents because she is deemed incapable of
consenting at that truly tender age.
It might seem that these age differences for the female
distinguish the two statutes also as regards mental element.
91. LA. R.S. 14:42(3) (1950 & Supp. 1978) provides in pertinent part:
Aggravated rape is a rape committed where the sexual intercourse is
deemed. to be without the lawful consent of the female because it is committed
under any one or more of the following circumstances: .. .(3) Where she is
under the age of twelve years. Lack of knowledge of the female's age shall not
be a defense.
92. See State v. Elias, 357 So. 2d 275, 278 n.4 (1978).
93. See J. HALL, supra note 8, at 212 passim.
94. See LA. R.S. 14:106 (Supp. 1977). The statute defines obscenity to include a
number of intentional acts. Additionally, the legislature has affixed a substantially
longer punishment when the violation "is with or in the presence of any unmarried
person under the age of seventeen years .... " LA. R.S. 14:106(G)(2) (Supp. 1977).
The article says that "[lhack of knowledge of age or marital status shall not constitute
a defense." LA. R.S. 14:106(B) (Supp. 1977). While addressing the same act, the
statute delineates different harms for which different punishments are provided. If a
defendant enticed an unmarried person under seventeen to commit an obscene act,
although not knowing the age or marital status of the person enticed, he could not
claim lack of fault. The fact that the defendant did not realize the degree of harm does
not alter the quality of his act.
95. The added requirement that there be an age difference of greater than two
years between the two persons, while a prudent provision, is not germane to this
discussion.
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One might point to the practical differences between involve-
ment with a consenting eleven-year-old," as opposed to a con-
senting sixteen year old, female. Blameworthiness seems evi-
dent whenever a male has intercourse with a female under the
age of twelve, regardless of the female's actual consent. On the
other hand, one may not consider a young defendant terribly
blameworthy when he has mistaken the age of a consenting
sixteen-year-old female. Accordingly, one might argue that
aggravated rape necessarily involves a mental element, while
carnal knowledge does not.
Nevertheless, how does the mental element of the defen-
dant charged with rape of an eleven-year-old differ from that
of the defendant charged with carnal knowledge of a sixteen-
year-old, when both defendants have made an honest mistake
as to age and the female has in fact consented? The defendant
charged with rape cannot defend on the basis of mistake as to
age. Concomitantly, he cannot contend that his criminal liabil-
ity is limited to carnal knowledge, rather than rape. The two
defendants do not differ with respect to their mental states or
the type of harm caused. Either both statutes require the same
mental element or they require none.
Apart from other reasons, penalty considerations alone
dictate that the statute require a mental element. As already
noted, the Criminal Code does not otherwise provide a penalty
exceeding six months in jail for strict liability offenses, except
in one peculiar instance." Why not simply consider carnal
96. Instances of sexual relations with children usually do not involve physical
coercion. J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN Lii' 578 (5th ed. 1976). As
for whether uncoerced intercourse with females under twelve presents a serious prob-
lem, one can hardly know. If such intercourse occurs as incest between father and
daughter, the crime is likely to go unreported. See J. COLEMAN, supra, at 576-77.
97. LA. R.S. 14:92.1 (Supp. 1954). See text at notes 63-67, supra. A few other
statutes in the Code lack an explicit statement of a mental element and provide for a
punishment exceeding six months. Generally the wording and context of these statutes
permit constructions requiring mental elements. LA. R.S. 14:67.4 (Supp. 1970) (theft
of domesticated fish from a fish farm) does not mention an intent to deprive. Neverthe-
less, see Morissette v. United States 342 U.S. 246 (1952). LA. R.S. 14:95.1 (Supp. 1975)
(possession of firearm or concealed weapon by a person convicted of certain felonies)
does not require that the possession or concealment be intentional. But see State v.
Fluker, 311 So. 2d 863 (La. 1975); State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So. 2d 24 (1955).
LA. R.S. 14:98 (Supp. 1978) (operating a vehicle while intoxicated-second conviction)
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knowledge another peculiar case? Indeed, the supreme court
has all but eliminated the problem, it would seem, by indicat-
ing to trial courts that in carnal knowledge cases jail terms
should be reserved for particularly blameworthy defendants. 8
Nevertheless, the fact remains that rape of a female under
twelve involves the same mental element or lack of one as
carnal knowledge. Even if initially one presumes the legislature
intended to impose up to a five-year jail sentence for carnal
knowledge as a strict liability offense, the presumption falters
when one considers aggravated rape to impose strict liability
when, until recently, the crime carried a mandatory death
sentence and even now carries a mandatory life sentence."
If blameworthiness often seems to be lacking in cases of
carnal knowledge, the problem may be that the statute sets the
age of the female (seventeen years) imprudently high for cur-
rent social conditions; not that the offense lacks a mens rea.
Once one recognizes this understanding of the serious crimes
defined by statutes which protect juveniles, it becomes clear
that the Criminal. Code defines no serious crime without a
mens rea. Accordingly, the writer suggests that this under-
standing be made explicit by construing article 8 in the manner
set forth herein.
Terrell and Elias pose the possibility of drifting thought-
lessly toward greater recognition of strict liability. Neither
is unclear as to whether criminal negligence is necessarily involved. The statement in
State v. Williams, 354 So. 2d 152, 155 (La. 1977), that "[d]riving while intoxicated
does not constitute criminal negligence per se in the crime of negligent homicide,"
(emphasis added) is not inconsistent with saying that in the crime of driving while
intoxicated the mental element of criminal negligence is involved. See discussion of
"harm" in text at notes 82-83. LA. R.S. 110(2), (3) (Supp. 1978) (simple escape)
punishes the "failure" of a prisoner on work release or furlough to return without
requiring that the failure be intentional. The fact that section 110(1) punishes only an
intentional departure provides reason to argue that the legislature meant to punish
"non-intentional" failure. Nevertheless, the interesting discussion of "voluntarily es-
cape" in State v. Boleyn, 328 So. 2d 95 (La. 1976), indicates the court's concern for
proof of a mental element in simple escape cases. LA. R.S. 14:141 (Supp. 1972) (prohib-
ited splitting of profits, fees or commissions) appears to be the type of offense found
to impose strict liability due to its regulatory nature, but it could nevertheless be
construed to require a mental element.
98. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 772 (La. 1979).
99. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), declared that the death penalty for
rape constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
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opinion adequately cogitates on the concept of mens rea. Given
the particular facts of these two cases, the court understanda-
bly may not have thought the cases warranted more thorough
consideration. The writer nevertheless submits that the signifi-
cance of the mens rea issue merits the court's studied consider-
ation in future cases and the adoption of the proposed construc-
tion of article 8.
